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When Demand Is a Function of Both
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Sellers are increasingly utilizing big data and sophisticated algorithms to
price discriminate among customers. Indeed, we are approaching a world in which
each consumer will be charged a personalized price for a personalized product or
service. Is this type of price discrimination good or bad? The normative assessment,
I argue, depends on the target of the discrimination. Sellers are interested in the
consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for their goods or services: they maximize prof-
its by charging a price that is as close as possible to the consumer’s WTP. This WTP
is a function of consumer preferences on the one hand and consumer (mis)percep-
tions on the other hand. When algorithmic price discrimination targets preferences,
it harms consumers but increases efficiency. When price discrimination targets mis-
perceptions, specifically demand-inflating misperceptions, it hurts consumers even
more and might also reduce efficiency. In such cases, legal intervention may be
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needed. In particular, when sellers use personalized pricing, regulators should fight
fire with fire and seriously explore the potential of personalized law.
INTRODUCTION
To maximize profits, sellers like to engage in price discrimi-
nation—to set higher prices for consumers who are willing to pay
more and lower prices for consumers who are willing to pay less.
In the past, such price discrimination was limited to coarse cate-
gories, for example, setting higher prices for business travelers
and lower prices for leisure travelers. No longer. Fueled by big
data, algorithmic price discrimination enables sellers to parse the
population of potential customers into finer and finer subcatego-
ries—each matched with a different price. In some cases, sellers
are even able to set personalized pricing, marching down the de-
mand curve and setting a different price for each consumer.1
Uber, Amazon, Staples, and the online video game store
Steam were found to vary price by geographic location and, in
Uber’s case, also by the time of day.2 B&Q, a British multinational
company, tested in its brick-and-mortar stores digital price tags
that interfaced with customers’ phones and adjusted the dis-
played price based on the customer’s loyalty cards data and
spending habits.3 Grocery stores are experimenting with digitized
and personalized pricing using e-coupons.4 Allstate was criticized
for optimizing prices based on its calculated likelihood that indi-
vidual users would comparison shop before purchasing insur-
ance.5 A recent study found that many retailers and travel sites
set personalized prices that vary by hundreds of dollars from one
consumer to the next.6 Indeed, new players, intermediaries, have
1 See Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman, The Economics of
Privacy, 54 J Econ Lit 442, 466 (2016) (“Tracking and measurability, in addition to
websites’ ability to dynamically update and personalize prices for each visitor, are bringing
online markets closer to the theoretical scenario of first-degree price discrimination.”).
This Essay focuses on price discrimination that is based on a consumer’s willingness to
pay (WTP). It does not engage with race-based or gender-based discrimination, including
price discrimination, that is unrelated to the consumer’s WTP. Note that, in some cases,
WTP is correlated with race and gender, and the resulting price discrimination can be
analyzed using the model that this Essay develops.
2 See note 24–26.
3 See note 29.
4 See note 30.
5 See note 31.
6 See note 23.
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appeared with the express purpose of identifying consumers’ will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and selling this information to retailers that
then use it to price discriminate.7
Price discrimination is based on the ability to identify the
consumer’s WTP. Indeed, the concept of WTP is central to any
discussion of price discrimination. And yet the richness and sub-
tlety of this concept has not been fully recognized. Standard ac-
counts of price discrimination assume, often implicitly, that a con-
sumer’s WTP is derived entirely from that consumer’s preferences
(and budget constraints). For example, some consumers are will-
ing to pay more for a health club membership because they enjoy
a greater benefit from the membership. These consumers may be
entertainers whose careers depend on a well-sculpted body, or
they may enjoy a direct benefit from working out, or they may
enjoy the status that comes with membership in a prestigious
health club. Other consumers have different preferences—they
enjoy a smaller benefit from a health club membership and thus
are willing to pay less for it. WTP, in the standard model, is all
about preferences.8
This view of WTP, I argue, is too narrow. In addition to pref-
erences, a consumer’s WTP is affected by the consumer’s percep-
tions or misperceptions.9 Consider, again, the health club exam-
ple. Assume that Consumer A and Consumer B hold identical
preferences and enjoy an identical benefit—which can be based
on health, aesthetics, or status—from attending the health club.
Further assume that both A and B will attend the club no more
than once a month, which inevitably limits the benefit that they
gain from membership. Yet while A realizes that she will attend
the club no more than once a month, B falsely believes that he
will attend at least once a week and thus overestimates the ben-
efit from membership. This misperception will have a substantial
effect on B’s WTP; he would be willing to pay more for the health
club membership than A would. Even consumers with identical
preferences (and budget constraints) may have very different
WTP measures. WTP is a function of both preferences and
7 See notes 32–34.
8 See, for example, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green,
Microeconomic Theory 6–9, 40–63 (Oxford 1995) (explaining that consumers’ individual
preferences, described as utility functions, determine their optimal consumption levels);
Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics 54–55 (Norton 8th ed 2010) (same).
9 This Essay adopts a broad definition of “misperception,” including any mistake
that affects the consumer’s WTP.
220 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:217
(mis)perceptions. Sellers use big data and sophisticated algo-
rithms to identify and measure both of these factors so that they
can set a personalized price equal to the consumer’s full, though
misguided, WTP.
A more complete understanding of WTP as a product of both
preferences and (mis)perceptions has significant positive and nor-
mative implications. In the standard model, in which WTP re-
flects only preferences, price discrimination harms consumers but
increases efficiency. Consumers are harmed because the seller—
a monopolist or any seller with sufficient market power to engage
in price discrimination—extracts the entire surplus by setting a
price that is just below each consumer’s WTP. Efficiency is in-
creased because price discrimination eliminates the monopoly
deadweight loss. The overall welfare assessment depends on the
relative weights of efficiency and distribution in the social objec-
tive function10 (unless the adverse distributional implications can
be neutralized through an appropriate adjustment to the tax and
transfer system11).
When WTP reflects both preferences and misperceptions,
specifically demand-inflating misperceptions, price discrimina-
tion hurts consumers even more and might also reduce efficiency.
The harm to consumers increases because consumers pay a price
that is equal to their perceived benefit, which exceeds their actual
10 See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic Theory at 386–87 (cited in
note 8) (“Of course, the distributional properties of this outcome would not be terribly at-
tractive in the absence of wealth redistribution: The monopolist would get all the aggre-
gate surplus generated by its product, and each consumer i would receive a surplus of
zero.”); Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 463–65, 480–81 (cited in note 8) (describ-
ing how perfect price discrimination enables a monopolist to “appropriate [consumer] sur-
plus for itself”); Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman, 54 J Econ Lit at 447, 452, 454–57, 466–67
(cited in note 1); Curtis R. Taylor, Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Infor-
mation, 35 RAND J Econ 631, 643 (2004) (finding that personalized pricing can have dis-
parate effects on consumer surplus and total welfare). See also Big Data: Seizing Oppor-
tunities, Preserving Values: Interim Progress Report *7–8 (Executive Office of the
President, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P658-P5G9 (referencing a White House
Council of Economic Advisors study, which found that differential pricing “will often,
though not always, be welfare-enhancing” but “can raise concerns about fairness”);
Natasha Singer, The Government’s Consumer Data Watchdog (NY Times, May 23, 2015),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/technology/the-governments-consumer-
data-watchdog.html (visited Oct 31, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (quoting Hal R.
Varian, Chief Economist of Google and professor emeritus at the School of Information at
the University of California, Berkeley, about price discrimination: “It is largely beneficial,”
Mr. Varian told the audience, citing examples such as discount offers for seniors. He
added, “You charge higher prices to people who can afford to pay higher prices.”).
11 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 669, 674 (1994).
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benefit. While, in the standard model, consumers are left with no
gain, here consumers suffer an actual loss. Efficiency is also com-
promised because price discrimination combined with overesti-
mation leads marginal consumers to purchase products when the
cost of production exceeds the actual benefit (but not the higher,
perceived benefit). With a larger distributional cost and a smaller
efficiency benefit, or even an efficiency cost, the case for legal in-
tervention becomes much stronger.12
These results are established using a graph-based economic
analysis. Starting with the neoclassical model, in which WTP is
derived from preferences alone, I replicate standard results about
the effects of price discrimination on consumer surplus and on
overall efficiency. I then turn to the main contribution of this
Essay: I develop a behavioral model in which WTP is derived from
both preferences and misperceptions. In this model, the actual de-
mand curve is supplemented by a perceived demand curve. Spe-
cifically, I study the implications of an overestimation bias that
pushes the perceived demand curve above the actual demand
curve. (I argue that a demand-inflating overestimation bias is
more likely in this context; the implications of underestimation
are explored in the Appendix.) I show that the overestimation bias
can substantially increase the welfare costs of algorithmic price
discrimination.13
While this Essay focuses on the costs of big data and the al-
gorithms that utilize these data, it is important to emphasize that
algorithms wielding big data also produce substantial benefits.
They allow for more precise matching between consumers and the
products and services that these consumers need or want. The
online ads that are relevant for one consumer would be annoying
spam for another. Of course, matching is efficient only when the
consumer is offered a product that she really needs or wants
12 See Paul Heidhues and Botond Kőszegi, Naïveté-Based Discrimination, 132 Q J
Econ 1019, 1020–21, 1026–27 (2017) (arguing that price discrimination that targets con-
sumers’ naïveté, a type of misperception, reduces welfare, albeit for reasons that are dif-
ferent than those analyzed here); Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Competi-
tion: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy 31–32, 117–30 (Harvard
2016) (arguing that “behavioral discrimination”—the authors’ term for discrimination that
targets cognitive biases—represents a starker wealth transfer from consumers to produc-
ers than traditional “price discrimination,” specifically, “[t]his behavioral discrimination
can increase consumption, optimize the extraction of wealth, and affect other important
values, such as privacy, equality and fairness”).
13 The analysis compares no price discrimination to perfect price discrimination. I
omit the qualifier “perfect” for the sake of brevity. Most of the results hold also with im-
perfect price discrimination.
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(preferences), not when she is offered a product that she mistak-
enly thinks she needs or wants (misperceptions).14 Big data and
sophisticated algorithms can also prevent inefficient cross-
subsidization. For example, in the consumer credit market, the
seller’s cost depends on the individual consumer’s creditworthi-
ness. In such markets, big data enables a different type of person-
alized pricing: pricing that tracks the seller’s cost rather than the
consumer’s WTP. This form of price discrimination is much less
objectionable and, in fact, is likely to increase efficiency and help
consumers.15 Finally, it is important to remember that big data
and algorithms also bring us price comparison sites and apps,
which work against price discrimination.
Because price discrimination is more harmful with misper-
ception, we should consider policies that curb price discrimination
(even if we were uncertain about such policies in a world without
misperception). Policymakers can target the foundation of algo-
rithmic price discrimination: big data. Because algorithmic price
discrimination is fueled by big data, this extreme form of price
discrimination can be curbed by limiting sellers’ access to infor-
mation about consumers’ WTP. This Essay thus provides a new
argument for increased privacy protections and enhanced data se-
curity measures. But attacking the big data foundation of price
discrimination runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. Given the benefits that personalization provides, cut-
ting the flow of information might be a net loss for consumers.
14 Another example of undesirable matching occurs when sellers vary the quality of
an offered product or service based not on the consumer’s preferences but on other factors
that make the consumer less profitable to the seller or reduce the consumer’s threat to
switch to a competitor. For example, CableOne bragged that it offered worse customer
service to customers with low FICO scores. See Karl Bode, CableOne Brags It Provides
Worse Service to Bad Credit Customers (DSL Reports, May 27, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/F8PX-NKKH. See David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boiler-
plate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmen-
tation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 Mich L Rev 983, 986, 988–1002
(2006) (discussing other costs of quality-based discrimination, focusing on contractual
terms as a quality dimension).
15 See, for example, What Does Phone Usage Say about Creditworthiness?
(PYMNTS.com, Dec 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KZ6Y-ZJ7B (discussing how sev-
eral Silicon Valley start-ups have used the large amount of data collected on consumers’
phones to assess their creditworthiness and offer them small loans at lower interest rates).
See also Ezrachi and Stucke, Virtual Competition at 90 (cited in note 12) (citing a 2010
Wall Street Journal report that showed Capital One personalized its credit card offers
based on new users’ credit scores).
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Personalized law suggests a more promising set of responses.
Demand-inflating misperceptions result in high prices. A stand-
ard response is to impose price caps.16 But standard price caps are
homogeneous, a single cap for the entire market, whereas price
discrimination results in prices that are too high but also hetero-
geneous. If a single cap doesn’t work, how about multiple, person-
alized price caps? If sellers use personalized pricing, then regula-
tors can respond with personalized price caps.17 The personalized
cap could track the misperception and thus undo its effects.
Another, softer approach uses the common disclosure technique,
but with a new twist. In a world of personalized pricing—
the world of price discrimination—disclosure mandates should
also be personalized.18 Namely, sellers should be made to provide
each consumer with individualized information on the benefit
that the particular consumer stands to gain from the product.
With such information, consumers will be able to separate out the
misperception-based component of their WTP and avoid overpay-
ing for the product or service.
A final comment on the domain of analysis: While this Essay
focuses on price discrimination in consumer markets, a similar
phenomenon occurs in labor markets. Employers are increasingly
using big data and sophisticated algorithms to set personalized
wages just above the individual employee’s willingness to accept
(WTA).19 Here too the problem can become more severe when we
16 See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill, Price Caps in Multiprice Markets, 44 J Legal Stud
453, 464–69 (2015).
17 The idea to use personalized price caps was first suggested by Ziv Ben-Shahar. Ziv
Ben-Shahar, The Ethics and Regulation of Personalized Pricing *28–35 (unpublished
thesis, Macalester College, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/HDF7-DXAR.
18 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Con-
sumer Markets 33–36 (Oxford 2012); Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law:
Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 309,
313–14 (2019).
19 Employers have long screened applications based on credit reports and
background checks, but many now also research a candidate’s presence online. See
Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle (NY Times, July 21,
2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/social-media-history-
becomes-a-new-job-hurdle.html (visited Nov 1, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable); Online
Reputation in a Connected World *6 (Cross-Tab, Jan 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/2JZY-CN6R (reporting that 75 percent of US employers research
applicants online). See generally Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal
Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10
Vand J Enter & Tech L 445 (2008); Nathan J. Ebnet, Note, It Can Do More than Protect
Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-employment Screening with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 97 Minn L Rev 306 (2012).
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look beyond the standard, preference-based model and recognize
that WTA is a product of both preferences and (mis)perceptions.
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows: Part I
sets the stage. Part I.A documents the rise of personalized pricing,
fueled by the big data revolution. Part I.B turns to WTP as the
main target of algorithmic price discrimination. It demonstrates
that misperception constitutes an important component of WTP
and offers evidence on the prevalence of misperception in
consumer markets and, specifically, on misperception as the
target of price discrimination. Part II is the analytical heart of the
Essay. It derives the positive and normative implications of price
discrimination when WTP is the product of both preferences and
misperceptions. Part III discusses policy implications. The
Appendix considers two extensions: the first introduces a positive
or negative correlation between preferences and misperceptions,
and the second studies demand-deflating misperceptions.
I. PERSONALIZED PRICING, WTP, AND CONSUMER
MISPERCEPTIONS
Part I motivates the analysis of price discrimination by doc-
umenting the rise of personalized pricing in the big data era. It
also takes a closer look at consumers’ WTP—the key piece of in-
formation that sellers need in order to price discriminate—and
distinguishes between preferences and perceptions, or mispercep-
tions, as components of the WTP.
A. Big Data and the Rise of Personalized Pricing
Sellers can make more money when they set higher prices for
consumers who are able and willing to pay more. Big data and
sophisticated algorithms allow sellers to do just that—to set per-
sonalized prices. Many sellers collect, or purchase, reams of data
about existing and potential customers.20 And a growing number
20 See, for example, Liz Mineo, On Internet Privacy, Be Very Afraid (Harvard
Gazette, Aug 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/XK4U-4KLW (quoting cybersecurity
expert Bruce Schneier: “I used to say that Google knows more about me than my wife does,
but that doesn’t go far enough.”); Sandy Parakilas, We Can’t Trust Facebook to Regulate
Itself (NY Times, Nov 19, 2017), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/
opinion/facebook-regulation-incentive.html (visited Nov 2, 2018) (Perma archive unavail-
able) (describing Facebook as “a company that reaches most of the country every day and
has the most detailed set of personal data ever assembled” in an op-ed by a former opera-
tions manager); Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability *23–31
(Federal Trade Commission, May 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/45BT-NY5F (describ-
ing how data brokers sell retailers a variety of marketing products and how five of the top
2019] Algorithmic Price Discrimination 225
of sellers, across multiple markets, are making use of data ana-
lytics to identify consumers’ WTP and to adjust pricing based on
the individual consumer’s WTP.21
Sellers price discriminate based on several types of infor-
mation, including consumers’ location, the time of day, the char-
acteristics of their computer (for example, operating system and
browser), and their purchase history.22 Sellers can collect this in-
formation themselves or purchase it from data brokers. Professor
Aniko Hannak and her co-authors analyzed real-world data from
three hundred consumers who visited sixteen e-commerce web-
sites, and found “evidence of personalization on four general re-
tailers and five travel sites, including cases where sites altered
prices by hundreds of dollars.”23
Evidence suggests that a consumer’s geographic location af-
fects sellers’ pricing decisions. For example, Uber collects rich ge-
ographic data about its customers and uses it to price discrimi-
nate.24 Also, Amazon, Staples, and the video game store Steam
were found to vary price by geographic location, in extreme cases
by up to as much as 166 percent.25 Uber reportedly uses time and
location to price discriminate, calculating a rider’s WTP for a par-
ticular route at a certain time of day and adjusting prices accord-
ingly.26 Characteristics of the consumer’s computer, tablet or
brokers alone generated revenue of nearly $200 million in 2012); Akiva A. Miller, What
Do We Worry about When We Worry about Price Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of
Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J Tech L & Pol 41, 45–47 (2014) (listing a num-
ber of techniques that online and brick-and-mortar retailers use to capture customer data).
21 See Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values at *7–8 (cited in note 10)
(noting that companies increasingly use big data for personalized pricing); Miller, 19 J
Tech L & Pol at 45–47 (cited in note 20) (describing how online sellers are increasingly
able to identify users and collect personal data, target their advertising and coupons, and
adjust prices rapidly and automatically); Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different
Prices, Thanks to Big Data (Forbes, Mar 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UW5W-
WQS6; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Joost Poort, Online Price Discrimination and
EU Data Privacy Law, 40 J Consumer Pol 347, 348–50 (2017).
22 See Miller, 19 J Tech L & Pol at 49–54 (cited in note 20); Aniko Hannak, et al,
Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-commerce Web Sites, Proceedings of
the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference 305, 316 (Nov 2014).
23 Hannak, et al, Measuring Price Discrimination at 317 (cited in note 22).
24 See Scott Duke Kominers, Uber’s New Pricing Idea Is Good Theory, Risky Business
(Bloomberg, June 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2T8E-J5K8.
25 See Jakub Mikians, et al, Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the
Internet *4–5 (Proceedings of the 11th Association for Computing Machinery Workshop on
Hot Topics in Networks, Oct 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/GP59-2QZQ.
26 See Eric Newcomer, Uber Starts Charging What It Thinks You’re Willing to Pay
(Bloomberg, May 19, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/J5XT-L32K:
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smartphone have also been shown to trigger differential pricing.
For example, one study found that Apple iOS and Safari users are
occasionally shown higher prices for the same product.27 Sophisti-
cated algorithms have identified correlations between these (and
other) factors and consumers’ WTP, and they use these correla-
tions to guide sellers’ pricing strategies.
Perhaps most useful for the price-discriminating seller is a
consumer’s purchase history. Purchase history, and even brows-
ing history, on the seller’s website or on other e-commerce sites is
an obvious source of WTP information for pricing algorithms.28
B&Q, a British multinational company, tested in its brick-and-
mortar stores digital price tags that interfaced with customers’
phones and adjusted the displayed price based on the customer’s
loyalty card data and spending habits.29 Grocery stores are per-
sonalizing pricing using digital coupons.30 And Allstate was criti-
cized for optimizing prices based on its calculated likelihood that
individual users would comparison shop before purchasing insur-
ance.31 Such examples of personalized pricing are becoming in-
creasingly prevalent.
Indeed, new players, intermediaries, have appeared with the
express purpose of identifying consumers’ WTP and selling this
valuable information to retailers. For example, a start-up com-
pany, Optimal Decisions Group, conducted research on consum-
ers’ WTP and sold this research, together with profit-maximizing
Uber calculates riders’ propensity for paying a higher price for a particular route
at a certain time of day. For instance, someone traveling from a wealthy
neighborhood to another tony spot might be asked to pay more than another
person heading to a poorer part of town, even if demand, traffic and distance are
the same.
27 See Hannak, et al, Measuring Price Discrimination at 315–16 (cited in note 22).
But see Mikians, et al, Detecting Price and Search Discrimination at *2 (cited in note 25)
(noting that their study found that “different OS/Browser combinations do not seem to
impact prices”).
28 See Kyle James, Abandon Shopping Cart: 17 Online Retailers Who’ll Bait You
Back with a Coupon (Rather-Be-Shopping.com, July 18, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/2GJU-GU74 (identifying eighteen retailers that offered coupons to custom-
ers who abandoned their carts, including Toys “R” Us, Bass Pro Shops, Bed Bath &
Beyond, Dick’s Sporting Goods, JC Penney, Macy’s, OfficeMax, and Williams-Sonoma).
29 See Sal Thomas, Does Dynamic Pricing Risk Turning Personalisation into Dis-
crimination? (Campaign, Oct 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8TNU-FCJN.
30 See In-Store Tracking Tech Gets Personalized (PYMNTS.com, Feb 9, 2018), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/MA5V-PTJV (noting the trend toward digitized and personalized
pricing in the grocery market, using coupons).
31 See Ezrachi and Stucke, Virtual Competition at 90–91 (cited in note 12).
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pricing models, to insurers.32 Another start-up, Freshplum, devel-
oped algorithms that are able to predict which customers will buy
only if given a discount and sold this targeted-discounts infor-
mation to e-commerce vendors.33 And TellApart, which had oper-
ated in the music industry, collected consumer data and advised
sellers on how to personalize their pricing schemes.34
While algorithmic price discrimination is clearly on the rise,
it is important to recognize several important limits to such per-
sonalized pricing. The first is arbitrage. When a consumer with a
low WTP can turn around and resell the product to a consumer
with a high WTP, price discrimination becomes more difficult.35
Personalized pricing is, therefore, more likely to occur in markets
in which arbitrage opportunities are limited, such as services
markets, markets for perishable goods, and markets in which
high transaction costs (including search costs) make arbitrage dif-
ficult.36 A second limit on personalized pricing is fairness. A con-
sumer who learns that she paid much more than another con-
sumer for the exact same product would feel wronged, and such
outrage is bad for business.37 Personalized pricing is more likely
32 See Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices (cited in note 21).
33 See id.
34 The music industry example, TellApart, is discussed in Adi Libson and Gideon
Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law, 86 U Chi L Rev 527, 531
(2019). For a discussion of a business TellApart took over—Freshplum—and other com-
petitors, see Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices (cited in note 21).
35 This assumes that sellers have information only on the consumer’s use-based
WTP—namely, the WTP that applies if the consumer purchases the product for personal
use. For a consumer who plans to resell the product, the true WTP is higher than the use-
based WTP. If sellers have information on the true WTP, then the arbitrage limit
disappears.
36 See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in Mark Armstrong and
Robert H. Porter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 2223, 2226 (Elsevier 2007)
(“It is well known that price discrimination is only feasible under certain conditions:
(i) firms have short-run market power, (ii) consumers can be segmented either directly or
indirectly, and (iii) arbitrage across differently priced goods is infeasible.”).
37 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am Econ Rev 728, 735–36 (1986);
Zuiderveen Borgesius and Poort, 40 J Consumer Pol at 355–56 (cited in note 21). See also
Eric T. Anderson and Duncan I. Simester, Price Stickiness and Customer Antagonism, 125
Q J Econ 729 (2010); Kominers, Uber’s New Pricing Idea (cited in note 24) (noting that
successful price discrimination can result in bad publicity and shift business to competi-
tors); Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices (cited in note 21) (customers have re-
acted negatively to stories about differential pricing, leading companies to guard such pol-
icies or avoid surcharges in favor of personalized discounts, which consumers accept more).
The importance of the fairness limit is debatable. For example, airlines have long charged
substantially different prices for identical seats without triggering a significant consumer
uproar. Either consumers are less sensitive to fairness concerns in this context, or the
airlines have managed to keep the differential pricing less salient to most consumers.
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to occur in markets in which consumers do not have direct
information about how much other consumers are paying and in
markets in which differential pricing is coupled with heterogene-
ous products such that comparisons between consumers become
difficult.38
B. WTP: Between Preferences and (Mis)Perceptions
We have seen that sellers increasingly collect and utilize big
data and sophisticated algorithms to identify consumers’ WTP
and set personalized prices equal or close to the individual con-
sumer’s WTP. But what exactly is WTP? What does it comprise?
What determines the maximum price that a consumer is willing
to pay for a product or service? In the standard, neoclassical
model, WTP is derived from the consumer’s preferences. Prefer-
ences are heterogeneous. Some consumers gain a large benefit
from a certain product and are thus willing to pay more for that
product. Other consumers gain a smaller benefit and are willing
to pay less for the same product. Consider a high-end steak
dinner. Some consumers really love steak and are willing to pay
a lot for the dinner. Other consumers enjoy steak but equally en-
joy a much cheaper burger. These consumers would be willing to
pay less for the steak dinner. And a third group of vegetarian con-
sumers have a WTP of zero. (The consumer’s budget constraint
also plays an important role in determining her WTP. But be-
cause the budget constraint plays an equally important role in the
behavioral model described below, it is not emphasized here.)39
The standard, preference-based theory of WTP is clearly
right and clearly incomplete. Preferences surely affect WTP, but
38 Consumers’ “aversion to surveillance” could impose another market-based limit on
personalized pricing if the personalized pricing suggests to consumers that they are being
surveilled by the seller. See Akiva, 19 J Tech L & Pol at 102–03 (cited in note 20).
39 Budget constraints and wealth effects are relevant to the analysis in this Essay in
two related ways: First, budget constraints and wealth effects suggest a positive correla-
tion between WTP and wealth and are, therefore, relevant for identifying the distribu-
tional implications of price discrimination. Second, budget constraints and wealth effects
suggest that a consumer’s WTP may be lower than the preference-based benefit that the
consumer would gain from the product or service. This means that, in the standard model,
perfect price discrimination does not leave consumers with zero surplus. And in the be-
havioral model, it means that perfect price discrimination may reduce the consumer’s gain
from the transaction rather than inflict an actual loss. At the extreme, if budget con-
straints rather than preferences determine consumers’ WTP, then misperceptions about
the benefit from a product or service will have no effect, although misperceptions about
price (or about the budget constraint itself) would continue to affect the analysis.
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other forces have an equally important, and sometimes more im-
portant, role in determining a consumer’s WTP. In particular, a
behavioral model of WTP recognizes that perceptions and
misperceptions substantially affect a consumer’s WTP. Recon-
sider our steak dinner. In addition to preferences for steak, con-
sumers’ WTP can be affected by their perceptions about the ben-
efits and risks from eating steak. For example, is the steak
organic or not? Does it come from grass-fed or grain-fed cows? Is
it free of antibiotics and hormones? How were the cows treated
before they were slaughtered? At least some consumers would be
interested in the answers to these questions, and their beliefs
about the answers will affect their WTP. Moreover, for some
(many?) consumers these beliefs will be false. They might think
that their steak comes from a grass-fed cow when, in fact, it
doesn’t. Or they might think that “organic” means one thing
when, in fact, it means something else.40 Perceptions, and misper-
ceptions, clearly affect WTP.
WTP is also affected by perceptions, and misperceptions,
about the price charged. Especially when price is contingent and
multidimensional, consumers might underestimate the total
price that they will end up paying for the product or service. Con-
sider a credit card with an annual fee of $50 and a late fee of $25.
The consumer’s true WTP, based on the benefit that this con-
sumer obtains from using the credit card, is, say, $60. Assume
that this consumer will be late twice and, thus, pay $50 in late
fees. The total price for this consumer is $100 (the $50 annual fee
plus $50 in late fees). And so, with accurate perceptions, the con-
sumer will not get the credit card. But what if the consumer opti-
mistically thinks that she will never be late? This misperception
transforms the total price of $100 into a perceived total price of
$50, and the consumer will get the card. The misperception oper-
ates on the price and not directly on the consumer’s WTP. But the
effect is the same. The misperception increases the de facto WTP
by $50.
Misperceptions that affect consumers’ WTP are quite com-
mon. They have been documented across multiple consumer mar-
kets. Consumers overestimate the benefits from health club sub-
scriptions because they overestimate how often they will attend
40 See Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin E. Davis, (Mis)perceptions of Law in Consumer Mar-
kets, 19 Am L & Econ Rev 245, 246–48 (2017) (citing evidence of consumer misperceptions
about the benefits and risks associated with different food products and how such misper-
ceptions affect purchasing decisions).
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the health club.41 Consumers overestimate the benefits, or under-
estimate the risks, from different types of foods because they do
not understand the meaning of “organic,” “natural,” “fruit juice
drink,” and other enticing labels.42 And consumers underestimate
the price that they will pay for credit cards, cell phone plans,
mortgages, and many other products and services.43
In most cases, the misperception manifests as an overestima-
tion of value or underestimation of price. The reason is that
sellers and service providers have strong incentives to promote
overestimation of value and combat underestimation of value
and, similarly, to promote underestimation of price and combat
overestimation of price. Indeed, sellers and service providers de-
sign their products, contracts, and pricing schemes to create or
enhance misperceptions that increase consumers’ WTP.44 There-
fore, the analysis in the next Part focuses on the implications of
algorithmic price discrimination when the perceived WTP ex-
ceeds the true WTP.45 (In some markets, misperception manifests
as an underestimation of value, or overestimation of price, such
that the perceived WTP is smaller than the actual WTP. This pos-
sibility is explored in the Appendix.)
Before turning to that analysis, however, it is important to
emphasize the link between price discrimination and consumer
misperception. We have seen that sellers increasingly use big
data and sophisticated algorithms to identify a consumer’s WTP
and set personalized prices—namely, to price discriminate. We
have also seen that WTP is generally the product of both prefer-
ences and (mis)perceptions. It follows that price discrimination
will target both preferences and misperceptions as equally im-
portant determinants of a consumer’s WTP.46
41 See generally Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the
Gym, 96 Am Econ Rev 694 (2006).
42 See Bar-Gill and Davis, 19 Am L & Econ Rev at 248 (cited in note 40); 21 CFR
§ 102.33(a) (regulating labels of beverages with fruit content).
43 See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract at 52–54, 117, 185–86 (cited in note 18).
44 Id at 24–25. On the other hand, there are market forces that work to reduce mis-
perception. For example, if misperception benefits one seller, her competitor may try to
educate consumers and reduce the misperception. See id at 30.
45 There are important limits on the prevalence of demand-inflating misperceptions.
First, if a seller promotes a misperception that boosts demand for her own product, this
misperception may well reduce demand for her competitor’s product. Second, because con-
sumers operate within a budget constraint, if all sellers attempt to inflate demand for
their respective products, then these attempts will inevitably cancel out on average.
46 See Heidhues and Kőszegi, 132 Q J Econ at 1020–21 (cited in note 12). Professors
Paul Heidhues and Botond Kőszegi developed a model in which sellers price discriminate
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Indeed, sellers are striving to improve their understanding of
consumer perceptions and misperceptions. Industry publications
suggest that big data and sophisticated algorithms are being used
to redefine the relationship with the consumer—to create “a dif-
ferent engagement effect with a particular consumer based on
what frame of mind they’re in at that point in time.”47 The refer-
ence to a consumer’s “frame of mind” suggests that sellers and
service providers are reaching beyond preferences and entering
the realm of perceptions and misperceptions. Related accounts
suggest that Facebook and Google are using the vast amounts of
data at their disposal to implement “cognitive” services, including
“assessing someone’s personality by sifting through their writ-
ings.”48 These services can then be utilized directly by Facebook
and Google or offered to other sellers and service providers.
Again, the reference to “cognitive” services that assess a con-
sumer’s personality suggests that sellers are trying to identify the
misperception component of the WTP.
As observed by Professor Ryan Calo, “Emerging methods of
big data present a new and vastly more efficient way to identify
cognitive bias by attempting to pinpoint profitable anomalies.”49
Calo further suggests that emerging technologies will “empower
corporations to discover and exploit the limits of each individual
consumer’s ability to pursue his or her own self-interest. Firms
will increasingly be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability
in consumers.”50 While sellers are evidently interested in con-
sumer psychology, the analysis below does not depend on sellers’
based on whether a consumer is sophisticated or naïve (or, more specifically, on the con-
sumer’s degree of naïveté). Naïveté can be understood as a type of misperception—a mis-
perception of one’s time preferences. One of the leading examples discussed by Heidhues
and Kőszegi concerns misperceptions about the likelihood of using, perhaps inadvertently,
the overdraft feature of a bank account and thus incurring overdraft fees. The authors
explain how banks will offer different prices to different consumers, raising the overdraft
fee charged to naïve consumers. See also Alexei Alexandrov, Generalizing Lessons from
Behavioral Economics across Many Biases *8–14 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Research Paper, Aug 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MLJ6-CBFC (studying a gen-
eral model of perfect price discrimination with a single biased consumer).
47 Actionable Insights: Issuers’ 2015 Resolution (PYMNTS.com, Dec 30, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/443W-FJ7Y.
48 Fuel of the Future: Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy (The Economist, May 6,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Y8G2-PNCB.
49 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 995, 1010 (2014).
50 Id at 999. See also Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, The Rise of Behavioural
Discrimination, 37 Eur Competition L Rev 484, 485–89 (2016) (describing “behavioural
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ability to disentangle the preference-based and misperception-
based components of the WTP. Indeed, to price discriminate,
sellers need to know only the full, albeit misguided, WTP.
II. MARKET OUTCOMES AND WELFARE EFFECTS
My goal is to study the effects of both price discrimination
and misperception and, specifically, the interaction between price
discrimination and misperception. I therefore construct and study
the following two-by-two matrix:
























The “No Misperception” column replicates the conventional
microeconomic analysis of first-degree price discrimination and
how it compares to a no–price-discrimination benchmark.51 I re-
view this analysis briefly in Part II.A. Then, in Part II.B, I turn
to the “Yes Misperception” column, the main contribution of this
Essay. (As I explain above, I focus initially on demand-inflating
misperceptions. I discuss demand-deflating misperceptions in the
Appendix.)
discrimination” as the combination of price discrimination techniques and behavioral eco-
nomics to exploit consumers’ cognitive biases to maximize firm profits by inducing con-
sumers to make irrational purchasing decisions).
51 See, for example, Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory at 384–87 (cited in note 8);
Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 439–49, 462–64 (cited in note 8). See also Arthur
Pigou,The Economics of Welfare 279, 285 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932) (coining the term “price
discrimination” and proposing the now-common three-degree classification system).
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A. No Misperception
Consider the most basic market setup in Figure 1A, with a
linear, downward sloping demand curve and a linear, horizontal
supply curve (reflecting a fixed-per-unit-cost assumption; let k
denote the per-unit cost).52 In a (perfectly) competitive market,
the intersection of the demand curve with the supply curve, at
(QC, PC), represents the market equilibrium, where QC represents
the equilibrium quantity and PC represents the equilibrium price
(which is equal to the per-unit cost, k).53 In terms of welfare, the
shaded triangle represents the consumer surplus—the difference
between the consumer’s WTP and the price, PC, aggregated across
all consumers. (Some consumers have a high WTP. They are rep-
resented by the high points on the left side of the demand curve,
and they enjoy more surplus. Other consumers have a lower WTP.
They are represented by the lower points of the demand curve,
close to QC, and they enjoy less surplus.) In a competitive market,
the seller enjoys no surplus at all—selling her product at a price,
PC, that precisely equals her per-unit cost of production. There-
fore, social welfare is equal to the consumer surplus as repre-
sented by the shaded triangle.
52 See, for example, Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory at 321 (cited in note 8);
Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 292–94 (cited in note 8).
53 See, for example, Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory at 316–22 (cited in note
8); Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 292–94 (cited in note 8).
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FIGURE 1A: NO MISPERCEPTION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
PERFECT COMPETITION
The perfect competition scenario serves as a useful baseline,
but a monopolistic market is more relevant for our purposes be-
cause at least some degree of market power is necessary for price
discrimination.54 (I focus on the extreme, monopoly case for ease
of exposition.) To assess the effects of price discrimination, we
must first consider, as a reference point, a monopolistic market in
the absence of price discrimination—namely, when the monopo-
list sets a single price. As compared to the competition case, a
monopolist will set a higher price, PM > PC, and sell fewer units of
the product, QM < QC.55 Consumer surplus is now represented by
the smaller shaded triangle. In a monopolistic market, the seller
enjoys a positive surplus, represented by the dotted rectangle,
which is equal to the number of units sold multiplied by the dif-
ference between the monopoly price and the per-unit cost:
QM ! (PM – k). Social welfare is, by definition, equal to the sum of
the consumer surplus and the producer’s (monopolist’s) surplus.
The black triangle represents the monopoly deadweight loss:
54 See note 36.
55 See Figure 1B.
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because of the higher price that the monopolist charges, consum-
ers who should buy the product refrain from purchasing it (spe-
cifically, the lost quantity is given by QC – QM); and the welfare
that these lost purchases would have produced constitutes the
monopoly deadweight loss.
FIGURE 1B: NO MISPERCEPTION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
It is time to introduce price discrimination. Specifically, I now
allow the monopolist to charge each consumer a different, person-
alized price. Using big data and sophisticated algorithms, the mo-
nopolist will identify each consumer’s WTP and set a personalized
price just below this WTP. Thus, a consumer with a high WTP on
the left side of the demand curve will pay a high price, and a con-
sumer with a lower WTP toward the middle or right side of the
demand curve will pay a lower price.56 Observe that the quantity
sold is QC, as in the competition case. But while competition gives
the entire surplus to consumers (the shaded triangle in
Figure 1A), a price discriminating monopolist keeps the entire
surplus for itself (the dotted triangle in Figure 1C; note that this
56 See Figure 1C.
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dotted triangle is equal in size to the shaded triangle in
Figure 1A). Price discrimination allows the monopolist to increase
the quantity sold—from QM to QC—thus eliminating the
deadweight loss and increasing the overall social welfare. This ef-
ficiency gain comes at a steep distributional price, however, as the
entire surplus goes to the monopolist and consumers are left with
nothing.57 Still, the efficiency gain is worth emphasizing. It is a
powerful argument in favor of price discrimination in the stand-
ard, no misperception model. I next turn to the misperception
case and show that this efficiency gain shrinks and might even
become an efficiency loss.
FIGURE 1C: NO MISPERCEPTION, WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
57 There are additional distributional implications for the consumer side of the mar-
ket. Consumers with a higher WTP, who would have purchased the product at the (no
discrimination) monopoly price, suffer an affirmative loss, as they pay more for the same
product. Consumers with a lower WTP are not affected—without price discrimination they
would have been priced out of the market, and with price discrimination they still get a
zero (net) surplus. Budget constraints and wealth effects, see note 39, add nuance to this
analysis: If WTP is smaller than the preference-based benefit, then perfect price discrim-
ination, while hurting consumers with a high WTP, affirmatively helps consumers with a
low WTP. And if WTP is positively correlated with wealth, then perfect price discrimina-
tion results in progressive redistribution.
2019] Algorithmic Price Discrimination 237
B. Misperception
Consumers might either overestimate or underestimate the
benefit from a product. I focus on overestimation for the reasons
I note above—sellers have an incentive to promote overestimation
and fight underestimation. I initially assume that the degree of
overestimation is not correlated with consumers’ preference-
based WTP—namely, that the average bias level is the same for
consumers with a higher preference-based WTP at the left-hand
side of the demand curve and for consumers with a lower
preference-based WTP toward the middle and right-hand side of
the demand curve. (This assumption is relaxed in Section A of the
Appendix.) Now, in addition to the actual demand curve, we have
a perceived demand curve. In Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C, the actual
demand curve is represented by the solid downward sloping line,
and the perceived demand curve is represented by the dashed
downward sloping line.
I start, as before, with the perfect competition baseline. In
Figure 2A, the price remains PC = k, but the equilibrium quantity,
QC', is larger. This quantity is determined by the intersection of
the supply curve with the perceived demand curve. In welfare
terms, consumers in the [0, QC] range still enjoy the same con-
sumer surplus as in the no misperception case. This surplus is
represented by the downward sloping–shaded triangle. These
consumers mistakenly believe that they are getting an even
larger surplus—the perceived extra surplus is represented by the
upward sloping–shaded trapezoid (above the supply curve)—but
this false belief does not harm them. There is, however, another
group of consumers who are harmed. These consumers, in the
[QC, QC'] range, should not purchase the product. They buy only
because of the misperception—they overestimate the product’s
value. These purchases create a welfare loss, which is both an ef-
ficiency loss and a loss to consumers (namely, the consumers bear
the entire efficiency loss). This loss is represented by the upward
sloping–shaded triangle (below the supply curve).
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FIGURE 2A: OVERESTIMATION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
PERFECT COMPETITION
Next, consider a monopolistic market but without price
discrimination. In the standard model, without misperception,
the monopoly price is determined by the demand curve.58 And
when consumers overestimate the value of the product, the price
is determined by the perceived demand curve. Therefore, the
monopoly price with misperception, PM', is higher than the
monopoly price without misperception, PM. The quantity sold
with misperception, QM', is also higher than the quantity sold
without misperception, QM.59 Turning to welfare: The higher price
reduces the actual consumer surplus, which is represented by the
shaded triangle. The perceived surplus is larger—the perceived
extra surplus is represented by the shaded trapezoid.
Overestimation causes some consumers to purchase the product
even though its actual value to them is lower than the price, PM'.
The loss incurred by these consumers is represented by the dotted
58 See, for example, Mas-Colell, et al, Microeconomic Theory at 384–86 (cited in
note 8); Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 458 (cited in note 8).
59 See Figure 2B. The overestimation inflates demand and thus increases the quan-
tity sold. The higher price somewhat tempers this quantity-increasing effect but cannot
reverse it.
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and shaded triangle. This loss reduces the (actual) consumer
surplus. Indeed, the consumer surplus might be negative—the
dotted and shaded triangle might be larger than the shaded
triangle. But whatever consumers lose, the monopolist gains. The
dotted and shaded triangle is part of the dotted rectangle, which
represents the monopolist’s surplus. Therefore, we have a
distributional effect but no reduction in efficiency. Indeed,
misperception increases efficiency. By inflating demand, the
overestimation bias increases the quantity sold—from QM to
QM'—and thus reduces the monopoly deadweight loss, which is
represented by the black triangle. Notice that the black triangle
in Figure 2B is smaller than the black triangle in Figure 1B.
FIGURE 2B: OVERESTIMATION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
When the misperception is even stronger and the perceived
demand curve shifts even higher above the actual demand curve,
the quantity, QM', can be larger than QC. In this case, the black
triangle disappears entirely, and the problem of insufficient pur-
chases is replaced with a problem of excessive purchases. Specif-
ically, consumers in the [QC, QM'] range inefficiently purchase the
product. Misperception can either increase or decrease overall ef-
ficiency in this market, depending on the relative magnitudes of
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the insufficient purchases problem (without misperception) and
the excessive purchases problem (with misperception).
Finally, consider a monopolistic market with price discrimi-
nation. The monopolist charges an individual price for each con-
sumer based on each consumer’s WTP.60 Whereas WTP is derived
only from preferences in the standard model (see Figure 1C), now
WTP is a product of both preferences and misperceptions (see
Figure 2C). Price discrimination allows the monopolist to march
down the demand curve, setting different prices for different con-
sumers. In the standard model, the monopolist marched down the
actual demand curve. Now the monopolist is marching down the
perceived demand curve. Turning to welfare: In the standard
model, the monopolist extracted the entire surplus. Consumers
gained nothing but also lost nothing. Here the monopolist is also
extracting perceived surplus, which is represented by the dotted
and shaded trapezoid. This extra gain to the monopolist is a loss
to consumers; the dotted and shaded trapezoid represents a
transfer from consumers to the monopolist—a distributional
effect with no efficiency implications.61 But price discrimination
in a model with misperceptions also has efficiency implications.
Consumers in the [QC, QC'] range should not purchase the prod-
uct. They buy only because they overestimate the product’s value.
These purchases create an efficiency loss, which is also a loss to
consumers (namely, the consumers bear the entire efficiency
loss). This loss is represented by the upward sloping–shaded
triangle (below the supply curve).62
60 See Figure 2C.
61 There are additional distributional implications for the consumer side of the mar-
ket, especially if we add budget constraints and wealth effects. See note 39. Consumers
with a high WTP, who would have purchased the product and gained a positive surplus in
the absence of price discrimination, lose that positive surplus and more. Consumers with
a low WTP, who would have been priced out of the market in the absence of price discrim-
ination, now purchase the product and pay a price equal to their full WTP, including both
the preference-based and misperception-based components. But as I note above, without
misperceptions, budget constraints may keep the WTP below the preference-based level;
and with misperceptions, if the bias level is sufficiently low, the full WTP may still be
below the preference-based level. Therefore, consumers with a low WTP may actually ben-
efit from price discrimination. And if WTP is positively correlated with wealth, then per-
fect price discrimination may result in progressive redistribution. Still, as compared to the
parallel effect in the standard model, misperception reduces the magnitude of any pro-
gressive redistribution. See note 39.
62 The upward sloping–shaded triangle representing the efficiency loss in Figure 2C
is identical to the upward sloping–shaded triangle in Figure 2A.
2019] Algorithmic Price Discrimination 241
FIGURE 2C: OVERESTIMATION, WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
In the standard model,63 in which WTP is derived from pref-
erences alone, price discrimination hurts consumers but in-
creases efficiency. Specifically, consumers enjoy no surplus at all,
but there is no deadweight loss. With overestimation, price dis-
crimination hurts consumers even more and may either increase
or decrease efficiency. Consumers are hurt more because now
they give up surplus that they do not have—perceived surplus—
and thus end up with a loss. In terms of efficiency, the insufficient
quantity problem is avoided, but an excessive quantity problem is
created. Whether price discrimination increases or decreases effi-
ciency depends on the relative magnitudes of the black triangle
in Figure 2B and the upward sloping–shaded triangle in
Figure 2C. And when the misperception is stronger such that QM'
is larger than QC, price discrimination definitely decreases effi-
ciency. In this case, there is an excessive quantity problem even
63 See Figures 1A–1C.
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in the absence of price discrimination, and price discrimination
only exacerbates this problem.64
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the standard model, price discrimination is bad for con-
sumers but good for efficiency. The need for legal intervention
thus depends on the relative weight of efficiency and distribution
in the social objective function.65 (Unless the adverse distribu-
tional implications can be neutralized through an appropriate
adjustment to the tax and transfer system.66) Adding demand-
inflating misperception, price discrimination is even worse for con-
sumers and might not have any redeeming efficiency advantage.
Therefore, when price discrimination targets misperception-
based WTP in addition to preference-based WTP, the case for le-
gal intervention becomes stronger. In particular, we should con-
sider policies that curb price discrimination, even if we were
uncertain about such policies in a world without misperception.
There are different ways to curb algorithmic price discrimi-
nation. Policymakers could impose a direct prohibition against
price discrimination. But this seems too blunt. They could facili-
tate market forces that interfere with price discrimination, spe-
cifically by making arbitrage easier and by disseminating infor-
mation that could trigger a fairness-based consumer backlash.67
(Regulators could also force sellers to disclose the lowest price for
which the product or service was recently sold.) Or policymakers
could target the foundation of algorithmic price discrimination:
big data. Algorithmic price discrimination is fueled by big data,
so this extreme form of price discrimination can be curbed by lim-
iting sellers’ access to information about consumers’ WTP—
namely, by increasing privacy protections and data security
64 In the standard model, price discrimination has another efficiency advantage: By
increasing the provider’s surplus, price discrimination increases the availability of prod-
ucts and services that require large fixed-cost investments (for example, a doctor may only
move to a small town if she can extract more surplus through price discrimination). And
consumers benefit from this increased availability as long as the price discrimination is
not perfect. In the behavioral model, even if the price discrimination is not perfect, con-
sumers will likely pay more than the product or service is really worth to them.
65 See, for example, Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 597
(Belknap 2004) (explaining that “[t]here is a vast multitude of ways of aggregating indi-
vidual utilities into a measure of social welfare,” including some that are purely utilitarian
and others that emphasize distributional equity, but that “no single way is endorsed under
welfare economics”).
66 See Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 669, 674–75 (cited in note 11).
67 See notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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measures.68 But big data and personalization generate benefits as
well as costs, and it is not clear whether choking off the flow of
information would provide a net gain for consumers.
What about personalized law? Algorithmic price discrimina-
tion occurs when sellers gain information about each consumer’s
individual WTP and set a personalized price equal to that con-
sumer’s WTP. When sellers utilize personalized pricing, policy-
makers can respond with personalized price caps. Price caps are
a common policy response to excessive pricing.69 The conventional
price cap applies uniformly to the entire market. But such a uni-
form price cap is a very blunt instrument. Why must a rich con-
sumer pay the same capped price as a poor consumer? Why must
a consumer who gains substantial value from a product pay the
same price as a consumer who gains much less value from the
product? Personalized price caps provide a subtler response.
The idea of personalized price caps was recently proposed by
Ziv Ben-Shahar as a response to fairness concerns about price
discrimination in a world without misperception.70 But a
personalized price cap can also directly address the extra harm
68 See, for example, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Rec-
ommendations for Businesses and Policymakers *i (Federal Trade Commission, Mar 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/L2JY-2CE4 (calling on companies to “[b]uild in privacy at
every stage of product development,” “[g]ive consumers the ability to make decisions about
their data,” and “[m]ake information collection and use practices transparent”); Natasha
Singer, Why a Push for Online Privacy Is Bogged Down in Washington (NY Times, Feb 28,
2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/obamas-effort-on-consumer-
privacy-falls-short-critics-say.html (visited Nov 2, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (de-
scribing the blueprint for the Obama Administration’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
and obstacles to its implementation); Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 OJ L119 1 (May 4, 2016) (adopting new data privacy regula-
tions for the European Union); Cedric Burton, et al, The Final European Union General
Data Protection Regulation (Bloomberg, Feb 12, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6BQ5-
48G7 (summarizing the GDPR’s drafting and adoption); Natasha Singer, Data Protection
Laws, An Ocean Apart (NY Times, Feb 2, 2013), online at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-laws-an-ocean-apart.html (visited Nov
2, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the divergence between recent US and
EU privacy law reforms). See also DoNot Track (Electronic Frontier Foundation), archived
at http://perma.cc/R5HK-CL4G (describing a promising initiative attempting to serve as a
means for stemming the flow of data to sellers who wish to engage in price discrimination);
David C. Vladeck, Digital Marketing, Consumer Protection, and the First Amendment: A
Brief Reply to Professor Ryan Calo, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 159, 163–64 (2014) (detailing the
Federal Trade Commission’s version of a “Do Not Track” initiative).
69 See Bar-Gill, 44 J Legal Stud at 464–69 (cited in note 16).
70 See Ben-Shahar, The Ethics and Regulation of Personalized Pricing at *28 (cited
in note 17).
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that price discrimination inflicts on consumers who overestimate
the benefit of a product. Specifically, a price cap equal to the
individual consumer’s preference-based WTP would neutralize
the effects of the misperception. Of course, regulators would need
a lot of information to implement such a personalized price-cap
regime. In particular, they would need to distinguish between the
preference-based and misperception-based components of each
consumer’s WTP. But in the world of big data, perhaps this
obstacle is not insurmountable.71
A softer personalized-law approach replaces price caps with
disclosure mandates. While disclosure mandates are a conven-
tional regulatory solution,72 this traditional technique has an in-
teresting, nontraditional twist in the present context. In a world
of personalized pricing—the world of price discrimination—
disclosure mandates should also be personalized. Namely, sellers
should be made to provide each consumer with individualized in-
formation on the product’s true value to that particular consumer.
With such a disclosure, consumers will be able to separate out the
misperception-based component of their WTP and thus avoid
overpaying.73 (It is not clear, however, if sellers would have, or
could easily acquire, the information that they are required to dis-
close. As suggested above, sellers have a strong incentive to iden-
tify consumers’ overall WTP, but they do not have a strong incen-
tive to disentangle the misperception-based component of the
WTP from the preference-based component.)
CONCLUSION
This Essay considered the positive and normative implica-
tions of sellers’ increasing ability to price discriminate—to set
71 For examples of recent work on personalized default rules, see Ariel Porat and
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112
Mich L Rev 1417, 1433–50 (2014) (observing that variable legal defaults may be more
effective in changing citizen behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regula-
tion, 78 U Chi L Rev 1349, 1399 (2011) (“Other default rules are personalized, in the sense
that they draw on available information about which approach best suits individuals, and
potentially even each individual, in the relevant population.”).
72 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know: The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure 3 (Princeton 2014) (noting the prevalence of disclosure
mandates and arguing that they often fail to achieve their goal).
73 Regulators around the world have already begun to experiment with personalized
disclosure mandates. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract at 37–40 (cited in note 43)
(describing mandated personalized disclosure of credit card interest rate and minimum
payment information). For an academic argument in favor of personalized disclosure man-
dates, see Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1422, 1474 (cited in note 71).
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personalized prices—when consumers’ WTP is the product of both
preferences and (mis)perceptions. The shift from a standard neo-
classical model, in which WTP reflects only preferences, to a more
realistic behavioral model, in which misperceptions significantly
influence consumers’ WTP, forces a substantial revision of stand-
ard results. Price discrimination, which appeared less harmful, if
not beneficial, in the neoclassical model, is revealed in the behav-
ioral model as a much more damaging, welfare-reducing practice,
at least when the misperception results in inflated demand
(which, as argued above, is likely the most common case).
Personalized pricing thus requires a policy response. And
while existing legal frameworks can be used to combat price dis-
crimination, the most promising or, at least, the most intriguing
policy response would fight personalized prices with personalized
law. Personalized price caps and personalized disclosure can
effectively reduce the adverse effects of price discrimination by
curbing sellers’ ability to set prices above consumers’ true,
preference-based WTP. When the market employs personaliza-
tion, regulators should fight fire with fire and seriously explore
the potential of personalized law.
APPENDIX
The Appendix considers two extensions. Section A discusses
the effects of a positive or negative correlation between the two
components of WTP—preferences and misperceptions. Section B
studies demand-deflating misperceptions.
A. Misperceptions Correlated with Preference-Based WTP
The analysis in the text assumes that the degree of misper-
ception is not correlated with the consumer’s preference-based
WTP. Graphically, this assumption is represented by a perceived
demand curve that is parallel to the actual demand curve. Put
differently, the perceived demand curve is represented by an up-
ward shift from the actual demand curve. What happens when
the degree of misperception is correlated with the preference-
based WTP?
From an efficiency perspective, the problem with mispercep-
tion is that marginal consumers with a low preference-based WTP
buy a product that they shouldn’t buy. Therefore, the efficiency
loss depends on the bias level of these marginal consumers. And
the bias level of the marginal consumers depends, in turn, on the
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following two factors: (1) whether the correlation between con-
sumers’ bias level and their preference-based WTP is positive or
negative; and (2) the per-unit cost of production or, more gener-
ally, the location of the supply curve in relation to the demand
curve.
The nature of the correlation between the misperception-
based and preference-based components of the WTP merits elab-
oration. When will this correlation be positive, and when will it
be negative? While a complete typology is beyond the scope of this
Essay, it is useful to consider the following general scenarios:
First, the correlation between consumers’ bias levels and their
preference-based WTP will be positive when bias is proportional
to (actual) value. For example, assume that Consumer A will
attend the gym twice a week and thus derive a value of $1,000
from gym membership and that Consumer B will attend the gym
four times a week and thus derive a value of $2,000 from gym
membership. (Consumer A’s preference-based WTP is $1,000, and
Consumer B’s preference-based WTP is $2,000.) Now assume that
both consumers overestimate the frequency of their gym visits by
50 percent. Consumer A thinks that she will attend three times a
week and thus derive a value of $1,500, and Consumer B thinks
that he will attend six times a week and thus derive a value of
$3,000. The same 50 percent bias level increases consumer A’s
WTP by $500 ($1,500 − $1,000) and Consumer B’s WTP by $1,000
($3,000 − $2,000). Second, the correlation between consumers’
bias levels and their preference-based WTP will be negative when
bias is negatively correlated with wealth. It is not that poor people
are more prone to bias; rather, rich people can afford to hire ex-
pert advisers—human or virtual—that mitigate bias and misper-
ception. And so, if preference-based WTP is positively correlated
with wealth, and wealth is negatively correlated with bias levels,
then the preference-based WTP will be negatively correlated with
bias levels.74
I start with the positive correlation case. In this case, the dis-
tance between the perceived and actual demand curves is larger
at the left-hand side of the graph and smaller at the right-hand
side of the graph. See Figure 3A. Therefore, when the per-unit
production cost is low (that is, the supply curve is low in relation
to the demand curve), the efficiency cost of price discrimination is
74 The term “preference-based WTP” may be too narrow when wealth effects are con-
sidered. A more accurate term would be “pre-bias WTP.”
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smaller relative to the uncorrelated misperceptions case.75 This
low per-unit-cost case is depicted in Figure 3A. The upward
sloping–shaded triangle (below the supply curve) is smaller in
Figure 3A, as compared to Figure 2C. In contrast, when the per-
unit production cost is high (that is, the supply curve is high in
relation to the demand curve), the efficiency cost of price discrim-
ination is larger relative to the uncorrelated misperceptions case.
Turning to the distributional implications of price discrimination,
the perceived surplus that the monopolist extracts, represented
by the dotted and shaded quadrilateral, is larger relative to the
uncorrelated misperceptions case; and this result holds regard-
less of the magnitude of the per-unit production cost. Intuitively,
the positive per-unit cost truncates the perceived demand curve
and the overestimation bias; this truncation effect is smaller in
the positive correlation case.
FIGURE 3A: CORRELATED MISPERCEPTIONS—POSITIVE
CORRELATION
75 The market for information goods is an example of a market in which per-unit
production costs are low (or zero).
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Next, consider the negative correlation case. In this case, the
distance between the perceived and actual demand curves is
smaller at the left-hand side of the graph and larger at the right-
hand side of the graph. See Figure 3B. Therefore, when the per-
unit production cost is low (that is, the supply curve is low in
relation to the demand curve), the efficiency cost of price discrim-
ination is larger relative to the uncorrelated misperceptions case.
This low per-unit-cost case is depicted in Figure 3B. The upward
sloping–shaded triangle (below the supply curve) is larger in
Figure 3B, as compared to Figure 2C. In contrast, when the per-
unit production cost is high (that is, the supply curve is high in
relation to the demand curve), the efficiency cost of price discrim-
ination is smaller relative to the uncorrelated misperceptions
case. Turning to the distributional implications of price discrimi-
nation, the perceived surplus that the monopolist extracts, repre-
sented by the dotted and shaded quadrilateral, is smaller relative
to the uncorrelated misperceptions case; and this result holds re-
gardless of the magnitude of the per-unit production cost. Intui-
tively, the positive per-unit cost truncates the perceived demand
curve and the overestimation bias; this truncation effect is larger
in the negative correlation case.
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FIGURE 3B: CORRELATED MISPERCEPTIONS—NEGATIVE
CORRELATION
In the standard model, without misperception, price discrim-
ination hurts consumers but increases efficiency. With demand-
inflating misperception, price discrimination hurts consumers
even more and either increases or decreases efficiency. Correlated
misperceptions add nuance to these results. The extra harm that
consumers incur is larger in the positive correlation case and
smaller in the negative correlation case. In terms of efficiency,
price discrimination is more likely to reduce efficiency (1) in the
positive correlation case when the per-unit production cost is
high, and (2) in the negative correlation case when the per-unit
product cost is low. These results are summarized in Table 2.
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Allowing for a positive or negative correlation between pref-
erences and misperceptions adds nuance to the analysis—either
increasing or decreasing the efficiency costs and distributional ef-
fects of price discrimination. But the bottom line remains: the be-
havioral model, in which WTP is derived from both preferences
and misperceptions, reveals price discrimination to be more
harmful than previously believed.
B. Demand-Deflating Misperceptions
The analysis in the text focuses on demand-inflating
misperceptions—namely, on overestimation of benefit or under-
estimation of price. I argue that these misperceptions are likely
the more prevalent type. Still, in some markets, a demand-
deflating misperception, either underestimation of value or over-
estimation of price, can reduce the perceived WTP below the
actual WTP. To complete the analysis, I study such demand-
deflating misperceptions and how they interact with algorithmic
price discrimination.76
I start, as before, with the perfect competition baseline. The
price remains PC = k, but the equilibrium quantity, QC', is smaller.
This quantity is determined by the intersection of the supply
curve with the perceived demand curve. See Figure 4A. In welfare
terms, consumers in the [0, QC'] range still enjoy the same con-
sumer surplus as in the no misperception case. This surplus is
76 The market for health insurance is likely an example of demand-deflating misper-
ceptions, as consumers underestimate future health care costs.
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represented by the downward sloping–shaded trapezoid. These
consumers mistakenly believe that they are getting a smaller sur-
plus—represented by the downward sloping–shaded triangle—
but this false belief does not harm them. There is, however,
another group of consumers who are harmed. These consumers,
in the [QC', QC] range, should purchase the product, but don’t, be-
cause of the misperception. These missed purchases create a wel-
fare loss—an efficiency loss that is borne entirely by consumers.
This loss is represented by the black triangle.
FIGURE 4A: UNDERESTIMATION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
PERFECT COMPETITION
Next, consider a monopolistic market but without price dis-
crimination. In the standard model, without misperception, the
monopoly price is determined by the demand curve. And when
consumers underestimate the value of the product, the price is
determined by the perceived demand curve. Therefore, the mo-
nopoly price with misperception, PM', is lower than the monopoly
price without misperception, PM. The quantity sold with
misperception, QM', is also smaller than the quantity sold without
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misperception, QM.77 Turning to welfare: In the standard model,
without misperception, monopoly pricing prevents some efficient
purchases, thus creating the infamous monopoly deadweight loss.
The underestimation bias prevents additional, efficient pur-
chases from taking place, thus increasing the deadweight loss.
Graphically, we see that the black triangle in Figure 4B is larger
than the black triangle in Figure 1B. Note that consumers in the
[0, QM'] range who purchase the product despite the mispercep-
tion enjoy a larger surplus thanks to the lower price.
FIGURE 4B: UNDERESTIMATION, NO PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
Finally, consider a monopolistic market with price discrimi-
nation. The monopolist charges an individual price for each con-
sumer based on each consumer’s WTP. See Figure 4C. Turning to
welfare, price discrimination clearly increases efficiency—it
reduces the deadweight loss because more consumers purchase
the product. Graphically, the black triangle in Figure 4C is
77 See Figure 4B. The underestimation deflates demand and thus decreases the
quantity sold. The lower price somewhat tempers this quantity-decreasing effect but
cannot reverse it.
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smaller than the black triangle in Figure 4B.78 The effect on the
consumer surplus, however, is ambiguous. In the standard model,
the monopolist extracted the entire surplus. Consumers gained
nothing. Here, the monopolist can extract only the underesti-
mated perceived surplus, which is represented by the dotted tri-
angle. The consumers are left with the difference between the ac-
tual surplus and the perceived surplus, which is represented by
the shaded parallelogram. So consumers enjoy a positive surplus,
but it is not clear whether this surplus is larger or smaller than
the surplus that they enjoy in the absence of price discrimination.
On the one hand, more consumers buy the product and enjoy this
difference between the actual and perceived surplus. On the other
hand, the consumers who also would have purchased the product
in the absence of price discrimination enjoy a smaller surplus (be-
cause they are charged a higher, personalized price).
FIGURE 4C: UNDERESTIMATION, WITH PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
MONOPOLY
78 Figure 4C depicts a scenario in which QM < QC'. When the underestimation bias is
larger, we can also get QC' < QM. But because QM' < QC' < QC in both scenarios, the
qualitative comparisons remain unchanged.
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In the standard model,79 in which WTP is derived from pref-
erences alone, price discrimination hurts consumers but in-
creases efficiency. Specifically, consumers enjoy no surplus at all,
but there is no deadweight loss. With overestimation, price dis-
crimination hurts consumers even more and may either increase
or decrease efficiency. Here, with underestimation, price discrim-
ination clearly increases efficiency and may or may not hurt con-
sumers. These results can be further refined by considering (as I
did in Section A of this Appendix) possible correlations—a posi-
tive correlation or a negative correlation—between the degree of
misperception and consumers’ preference-based WTP. But the
basic conclusion remains: algorithmic price discrimination is less
worrisome in markets with underestimation. And as a result,
legal intervention is less necessary in markets with demand-
deflating misperceptions.
79 See Figures 1A–1C.
